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Abstract: 
Popular historiography of the Vietnam War often focuses on the apparently rampant drug 
use which characterized many American servicemen stationed in Vietnam.  Indeed, 
historical commentators have suggested that Vietnam marked the first war where drug 
abuse constituted a serious threat to the American military effort.  What accounted for 
this widespread use of drugs in Vietnam?   While statistics and historical accounts can 
provide a sense of the breadth of this problem, fictional accounts written by Vietnam War 
veterans and accomplished authors such as Larry Heinemann, Tim O’Brien, and Gustav 
Hasford can provide narrative weight, from a soldier’s perspective, as to just how 
compelling illicit drugs could be to beleaguered American servicemen.  From these 
works we can observe how 1) the rapidly commercialized culture and markets of South 
Vietnam – built to cater to every conceivable GI want or need; 2) the young, disillusioned 
soldier’s need for an escape from the psychological horrors of a guerilla war; and 3) the 
inability and reluctance of military authorities to crack down on illicit drug use, all 
contributed to a conducive environment where drug abuse among soldiers could, and 
indeed, did, flourish.  2 
Introduction  
 
Today, the ever-worsening “quagmire” in Iraq is routinely analogized to the 
Vietnam conflict, which is often viewed as the paradigm of a war gone wrong.  Indeed, 
the Vietnam War has been called “the antithesis of the promise of American life,” and is 
largely remembered as a tragic operation which helped divide an increasingly radicalized 
American population, while eventually failing in its stated objective of “protecting” 
South Vietnam from communist control.
1  If World War II can be symbolized by the 
famous image of U.S. Marines erecting an American flag on the sands of Iwo Jima, the 
Vietnam War may be most accurately summarized by Dutch photographer Hubert Van 
Es’s famous shot of frantic South Vietnamese civilians boarding an evacuation helicopter 
at the Saigon Embassy. 
Popular perception of the war in Vietnam, moreover, is often characterized by 
unsavory anecdotes which recount the torture and mutilation of soldiers, the wanton 
slaughter and rape of civilians, the indiscriminate destruction of the Vietnamese 
livelihood and ecosystem, and, of course, the gratuitous abuse of drugs by American 
servicemen.  It is this last aspect of the war which is the subject of this paper, which looks 
to explain and contextualize the rampant drug use which plagued the U.S. military in 
Vietnam to sights unseen in any American wars before or since.   
Drug use indeed presented a serious problem for the military effort in Vietnam.  
As one historian has noted, “[a]lthough drugs had certainly been available and used in 
previous wars, Vietnam was the first time drug use became so prevalent that it threatened 
                                                 
1 Peter C. Rollins, The Vietnam War: Perceptions through Literature, Film, and Television, 36 AMERICAN 
QUARTERLY 419, 420 (1984).     3 
to break the U.S. military.”
2  Use of drugs such as marijuana by troops in Vietnam began 
as early as 1963, but as career servicemen and volunteers – as opposed to draftees –made 
up the bulk of the U.S. troop presence in Vietnam during these earlier years, drug use did 
not present as serious a problem.  However, by 1967 or 1968, “the increasing reliance 
upon draftees to supply troops in Vietnam…altered the drug landscape,” and drug usage 
had increased dramatically.
3  For instance, during 1966, only 1.8 percent of personnel in 
Vietnam came under investigation by military authorities for marijuana usage.  By 1968, 
1969, and 1970, however, this figure had jumped drastically, to 7.99, 14.77, and 20.27 
percent, respectively.
4  Rates of heroin usage, meanwhile, also increased rapidly starting 
in 1970, leading to a “GI heroin epidemic” as technical advancements in local refinement 
processes led to the drastically increased availability of high quality heroin.
5  Indeed, a 
study of enlisted men discharged from 12-month tours in September 1971 suggested that 
80 percent of these GIs had tried marijuana, as had 38 percent opium, 34 percent heroin, 
and 20 percent amphetamines or barbiturates.  Furthermore, a full 20 percent of these 
soldiers testified that they were addicted to opiates, and most of these had experienced 
withdrawal symptoms.
6  By 1971, this plague of drug use, compounded by other malaises 
such as widespread dissent among troops, refusals to enter combat, “fraggings” (murder 
by fragmentation grenade) of commissioned or non-commissioned officers (NCOs) in the 
field, purposeful evasions of enemy troops (tactics known as “search and evade,” a glib 
                                                 
2 WILLIAM THOMAS ALLISON, MILITARY JUSTICE IN VIETNAM: THE RULE OF LAW IN AN AMERICAN WAR 
121 (University Press of Kansas 2007). 
3 Id. at 121-22. 
4 See infra Appendix.   
5 ALFRED MCCOY, THE POLITICS OF HEROIN: CIA COMPLICITY IN THE GLOBAL DRUG Trade 224 (Lawrence 
Hill Books 1991).   
6 GRIFFITH EDWARDS, MATTERS OF SUBSTANCE DRUGS – AND WHY EVERYONE’S A USER 125 (Thomas 
Dunne Books 2004).   4 
variation on “search and destroy”), and outright desertions “all pointed to a military on 
the verge of collapse.”
7 
However, statistics cannot tell the whole story, as this drug epidemic in Vietnam 
“cannot be comprehended without an awareness of what it felt like to be an American 
caught up in that war.”
8  While historical accounts help to illuminate the extent of drug 
use among American troops in Vietnam, they do not serve as well to indicate why drugs 
were so widely used in the first place.  The literary canon of novels which are set in 
Vietnam during the war can provide narrative weight which may help to discern deeper, 
more probing answers to this question.  As author Tim O’Brien explains in his novel The 
Things They Carried: 
In any war story, but especially a true one, it’s difficult to separate what 
happened from what seemed to happen.  What seems to happen becomes 
its own happening and has to be told that way.  The angles of vision are 
skewed.  When a booby trap explodes, you close your eyes and duck and 
float outside yourself.  When a guy dies…you look away and then look 
back for a moment and then look away again.  The pictures get jumbled; 
you tend to miss a lot.  And then afterward, when you go to tell about it, 
there is always that surreal seemingness, which makes the story seem 
untrue, but which in fact represents the hard and exact truth as it seemed.
9  
 
The significance of these novels, then, as opposed to, perhaps, histories of the war, is that 
they may better describe, from the soldiers’ perspective, the strange environment which 
they perceived as they came to Vietnam.  This was an exotic milieu which not only 
allowed servicemen to easily obtain illicit drugs, but also, because of the day-to-day 
horrors and exigencies of its war, encouraged them to abuse them, and allowed them to 
do so without substantial fear of discipline.   
                                                 
7 ALLISON, supra note 2, at 67. 
8 EDWARDS, supra note 6, at 124. 
9 TIM O’BRIEN, THE THINGS THEY CARRIED 71 (Broadway Books 1998) (1990)[hereinafter THINGS].     5 
The authenticity of the literary accounts chosen for this paper, moreover, is 
heightened by the fact that all three authors whose works are analyzed served as front-
line soldiers, or “grunts,” in Vietnam, and that their works are based to a certain extent on 
their own experiences.  For example, Larry Heinemann, the author of Close Quarters and 
Paco’s Story, ran mechanized reconnaissance missions as an armored personnel carrier 
driver with the Army’s 25
th (Tropic Lightning) Infantry Division at Cu Chi and Dau 
Tieng from March 1967 to March 1968.
10  Meanwhile, Tim O’Brien, author of Going 
After Cacciato and The Things They Carried, served as an infantryman with the 23
rd 
(Americal) Division (a platoon of which infamously carried out the massacre of 
Vietnamese civilians at My Lai) from January 1969 to March 1970.
11  And finally, 
Gustav Hasford, author of The Short-Timers, served as a Marine combat correspondent 
with the 1
st Marine Division, and fought in the brutal Battle of the Hue during the Tet 
Offensive.
12  These experiences help account for the harrowing realism which 
characterizes the narration of these works. As Heinemann once suggested in an interview: 
“How else to represent the authenticity of story – especially the war story – than through 
the perception of the individual?”
13   
Finally, the fact that the works examined in this paper have merited widespread 
critical success, moreover, helps legitimate the genuineness of their accounts as subjects 
for study.  Heinemann’s harshly poetic novel Paco’s Story,
14 which chronicles the 
                                                 
10 Julia Keller, The Wound that Won’t Heal: The Vietnamese long ago Put the War behind Them, but 
Americans Still Argue over What Went Wrong, CHI. TRIB., April 10, 2005, § Magazine, at 10. 
11 Jesse Leavenworth, Vietnam Imbues Tim O’Brien and his Books, THE HARTFORD COURANT, January 22, 
2006, at G2.   
12 Hal Lipper, The Pen Behind Kubrick’s Vision: Writer Gustav Hasford’s Vietnam is Different from that of 
Recent Films, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, July 12, 1987, at 1F. 
13 A Conversation with Larry Heinemann, June 25, 1997, available at 
http://www.theatlantic.com/unbound/factfict/heinint.htm. 
14 LARRY HEINEMANN, PACO’S STORY (Penguin Books 1987) (1986)[hereinafter PACO’S].     6 
haunted, nomadic existence of the lone G.I. survivor of a massacre, won the 1987 
National Book Award for fiction, beating out Nobel Prize winner Toni Morrison’s best 
known work, Beloved.
15  Paco’s Story had followed, in turn, on the heels of Heinemann’s 
well-received first novel, Close Quarters, which recounted a draftee’s experience as a 
soldier in a front-line armored cavalry company.
16  O’Brien, for his part, won the 
National Book Award for fiction in 1979 for his novel Going After Cacciato, the story of 
a squad of soldiers who set off on a whimsical search for a deserter – a fantastic voyage 
which takes them overland to Paris.
17  In addition, The Things They Carried,
18 another 
O’Brien novel which delves introspectively into the minds of a squad of “grunts,” was a 
finalist for both the Pulitzer Prize and the National Book Critics Circle Award.
19  And 
finally, the last novel which will be examined in this paper includes Hasford’s The Short-
Timers,
20 which tells the odyssey of a Private Joker as he is transformed from a green 
Marine recruit into a hardened killer.  Hasford eventually helped develop this novel into 
the Academy Award-nominated screenplay for legendary director Stanley Kubrick’s Full 
Metal Jacket.
21   
                                                 
15 The decision to award Heinemann, a relatively unknown author, was a controversial decision at the time.   
After this award was announced, and after Beloved failed to win the National Book Critics Circle Award 
for Fiction as well, forty-eight prominent African American critics and writers wrote an open letter to the 
New York Times Book Review, protesting what they saw as “oversight and harmful whimsy.”  A few 
months later, Beloved won the Pulitzer Prize.  Louis Menand, All that Glitters, THE NEW YORKER, 
December 26, 2005, at 136.   
16 LARRY HEINEMANN, CLOSE QUARTERS (Vintage Contemporaries 2005) (1977)[hereinafter QUARTERS]. 
17 TIM O’BRIEN, GOING AFTER CACCIATO (Broadway Books 1999) (1978)[hereinafter CACCIATO]. 
18 THINGS, supra note 9. 
19 The Things They Carried received multiple votes in a recent New York Times Book Review survey which 
asked leading writers, critics, and editors to name the “single best work of American fiction published in 
the last 25 years.”  Incidentally, Toni Morrison’s Beloved topped this list.  What is the Best Work of 
American Fiction of the Last 25 Years?, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2006, §7, at 16. 
20 GUSTAV HASFORD, THE SHORT-TIMERS (1979)[hereinafter SHORT-TIMERS],  
http://www.gustavhasford.com/ST2.htm. [citations are to author’s free online version, as the novel has long 
been out of print] 
21 FULL METAL JACKET (Warner Brothers Pictures 1987).   7 
The discussion section of this paper is divided into three parts, each of which 
provides a brief historical description of the topic at hand before delving into literary 
analysis of the works at hand.  Part I provides historical background of the French 
colonial drug trade and subsequent tacit American support of the flourishing black market 
in Vietnam, and examines how American soldiers were faced with a veritable cornucopia 
of drugs and other services offered by a rapidly commercializing Vietnamese society.  
Part II presents a description of the unique characteristics of draftees and military tactics 
in Vietnam, and describes how factors such as civil war, guerilla warfare, and hellish 
jungle terrain made drug use all the more appealing as an escape route for disillusioned 
American troops.  Finally, Part III provides an account of the limited nature of military 
enforcement against drug abuse, and also examines how informal laws of the “field” may 
have superseded formal military procedure amidst the exigencies and practicalities of 
waging the brutal war in Vietnam.   
 
Discussion 
I. Availability of Drugs in Vietnam   
A. Historical Background 
Prior to the arrival of Europeans, the people in Southeast Asia had used opium – a 
product of the central highlands, or “Golden Triangle” of Myanmar, Laos, Vietnam, and 
Thailand – for primarily medical purposes, as habitual use of the drug was stigmatized 
within Vietnamese culture.
22  However, the introduction of tobacco and the tobacco pipe 
by Portuguese and Spanish traders resulted in the practice of mixing tobacco with opium 
and the subsequent proliferation of recreational use within China and among Chinese 
                                                 
22 ALLISON, supra note 2, at 118.     8 
living in Southeast Asia.
23  By the late nineteenth century, profits from opium-related 
trade, smokehouses, and “related corruption” had come to account for over 40 percent of 
colonial revenues in the region, and, as international demand grew, so too did illicit 
markets and corresponding government corruption.
24  Furthermore, as the French came to 
dominate Southeast Asia, they set up their own lucrative opium monopoly and processed 
shipments of opium in and around Saigon.
25  These practices significantly increased 
endemic use of the drug in Indochina, which began “to backfire on the French colonial 
administration” as it enflamed Vietnamese nationalists, hurt the work force, and helped 
the proliferation of corruption.
26  Nevertheless, during the French-Indochina War in the 
mid-twentieth century, the French intelligence service, finding itself short of funds, took 
control of the black market in opium.
27   
As the Americans gradually took over the French anti-communist sphere in 
Indochina, they too, despite initial idealistic assessments of Vietnamese democratic 
reform, brought with them eventual clandestine support of the opium trade.
28  For 
instance, during the early 1960s, the CIA came to support highland agrarian tribes such as 
the Meo (i.e. Hmongs), as allies against communism, and permitted their opium 
production to flourish.
29  It even seems likely that CIA “Air America” planes helped to 
transport opium and heroin from the landlocked Golden Triangle region to the urban 
center of Saigon.
30   
                                                 
23 ALLISON, supra note 2, at 118. 
24 ALLISON, supra note 2, at 118.  
25 Id. 
26 Id. at 119. 
27 MCCOY, supra note 5, at 131.   
28 ALLISON, supra note 2, at 120. 
29 MCCOY, supra note 5, at 195-96.   
30 Id. at 96.  Alexander Cockburn and Jeffrey St. Clair, WHITEOUT: THE CIA, DRUGS AND THE PRESS 245 
(Verso 1998).    9 
In 1963, with the South Vietnamese police state apparatus thrown asunder 
following the murder of formerly U.S.-backed President Ngo Dinh Diem, Saigon 
disintegrated into a series of coups and counter-coups, as communist guerrillas 
surrounded the city.  These guerillas managed to bomb the U.S. Officer’s Club in Saigon 
in late 1964, along with the U.S. Embassy the following year.
31  Amidst this chaos, the 
U.S. turned to strongman Premier Nguyen Cao Ky and his “power broker,” General 
Nguyen Ngoc Loan.  With American approval, Loan re-instituted Diem’s ruthless police 
tactics, which depended on paid informants whose payments stemmed, of course, from 
the lucrative opium trade.
32  This system – which continued with successive American-
backed and financed South Vietnamese governments – led to the ironic result that 
“[p]eriodic attempts by American agents to smash the elaborate smuggling network were 
thwarted by their superiors in the U.S. mission,”
33 as any successful crackdown “would 
have exposed nearly every prominent member of the Saigon regime.”
34  By late 1969 and 
early 1970, moreover, laboratories in the Golden Triangle region came to perfect the 
heroin refining process, thereby drastically increasing the available supply of heroin in 
Vietnam.
35   
  This heroin, highly refined and virtually government-protected, easily found its 
way into the hands of American soldiers, as American military installations were often 
staffed by numbers of Vietnamese, and American troops would invariably come to be 
surrounded by civilians trying to sell them any manner of goods or services.  One 
byproduct of the American military strategy known as “pacification” – which essentially 
                                                 
31 MCCOY, supra note 5, at 208. 
32 MCCOY, supra note 5, at 211. 
33 STANLEY KARNOW, VIETNAM: A HISTORY 455 (Penguin Books 1997). 
34 Id. 
35 MCCOY, supra note 5, at 222.   10 
called for the wanton destruction of Vietnamese farms and villages in order to deny food 
to guerrilla forces – was the tragic destruction of rural subsistence farming and 
traditionally strong ties among Vietnamese families.  Accordingly, Vietnamese youths 
often sought to escape this poverty by flocking to urban centers or military installations 
crowded with affluent American troops or their support personnel.
36  These Vietnamese 
might work officially, for instance, in U.S. military clubs, laundries, barbershops, and so 
on, or they might cater unofficially to somewhat baser needs, as prostitutes or drug 
dealers.
37  As a result, items such as potent marijuana – which grew naturally in the warm 
and humid Vietnamese countryside – could be easily purchased from street vendors, 
barkeeps, and taxi drivers for less than $1 per pack of prepackaged “joints.”
38  Similarly, 
an addiction to nearly pure heroin (incredibly expensive in the U.S.) could be financed 
for as little as $6 a day.
39  All in all, as the great American military machine came to 
Vietnam, it brought with it not only American luxuries but also true laissez-faire 
American commercialism, and this “great American cornucopia inevitably spilled its 
wares into the local economy and the streets of Saigon and other South Vietnamese 
cities.”
40  Within such a thriving black market economy, drugs could be found and 
purchased easily by the relatively wealthy American servicemen. 
B. Literary Analysis  
  This theme of the American-driven commercialization and corruption of 
traditional Vietnamese society, which results in the ubiquitous availability of every 
manner of goods and services for curious servicemen, seems to permeate these novels.  
                                                 
36 KARNOW, supra note 33, at 454. 
37 Id. at 455. 
38 ALLISON, supra note 2, at 122.   
39 EDWARDS, supra note 6, at 126. 
40 KARNOW, supra note 33, at 453.   11 
For example, in one scene in The Short-Timers, Corporal Joker and his fellow Marine 
correspondent and “new guy” Rafter Man, come across a group of South Vietnamese 
troops looting a mansion.  Debunking the rumor that all “Arvins” (members of the Army 
of the Republic of Vietnam) are cowards who fear fighting, Joker explains: “They were 
drafted by the Saigon government, which was drafted by the lifers who drafted us, who 
were drafted by the lifers who think that they can buy the war.  And Arvins are not 
stupid.”
41  As such, Joker seems to imply, the Arvins are merely being pragmatic, and 
joining – just as their corrupt leaders are – the mad rush for cash caused by the massive 
influx of funds and materiel from the U.S. military machine.  When Rafter Man asks 
Joker whether the Arvins get paid by their government, Joker sardonically replies that 
“money is their government.”
42  In a similar sequence, Joker interprets the elusive smile 
of a Vietnamese woman selling them overpriced bottles of Coca Cola: “Oh well, the 
Americans may be assholes but they are very rich.”
43 
In this Vietnamese milieu of no-nonsense capitalism, the relatively wealthy 
soldiers in these works seem empowered and able to purchase anything, ranging from 
necessary goods or services to ridiculous trivialities – with either category perhaps 
including illicit drugs, depending on the soldier concerned.  In Paco’s Story, an unnamed 
narrator – a ghost of a soldier in Alpha Company, of which Paco is the lone survivor – 
vividly describes the Phuc Luc base camp:  
Now, the Viets worked the PX checkout counters (good-looking women 
who had to put out right smart and regular to keep their jobs), the PX 
barbershop (where the Viet barbers could run a thirty-five-cent haircut into 
$6.50 in fifteen minutes, and the stylishly thatched souvenir shack (where 
a bandy-legged ARVN cripple sold flimsy beer coolers and zip-a-dee-doo-
                                                 
41 SHORT-TIMERS, supra note 20, at 30. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 28.   12 
dah housecat ashtrays, and athletic-style jackets that had a map 
embroidered on the back with the scrolled legend Hot damn – Vietnam 
sewn in underneath.
44 
 
This juxtaposition of coerced sex workers, shifty barbers, and a crippled veteran hawking 
absurdly campy “Vietnam” jackets eloquently captures a sense of the tragic culture of 
consumption made available to the American war machine in Vietnam.  The effects of 
this socially disruptive phenomenon seem to spread far into the countryside, and extend 
to Vietnamese of all ages, as wherever the rich Americans went, sellers were soon to 
follow.  When the armored cavalry in Close Quarters takes a break on the road near a 
village called Suoi Dai, immediately “the Coke and beer and dope and [pimps] 
arrive…[coming] in small groups, like a parade, stretching out…and hawking to the 
crews.”
45  Dosier, a driver, narrates how some of his comrades go off toward a creek 
embankment with “the platoon [prostitute],” while “small girls not even into puberty yet” 
try to sell them Coca-Cola, beer, and marijuana.
46  One of the girls calls out: “Hey Sebbo-
twee [Seven-three, one of the driver’s call signs]!  Gaa-damma, you wann Coke?  You 
wann bee-a!  Got dope, too.”
47   The poignant sight of this “barefoot” and “filthy” girl – 
whose American nickname is “No-Tits” – hawking illicit drugs in pidgin, curse-laden 
English highlights just how extensively illicit trade had taken over a newly capitalistic 
South Vietnam, which catered to the vast needs of the American military by offering the 
young men anything they wanted, and at the right price.  Indeed, in one telling instance, 
                                                 
44 PACO’S, supra note 14, at 8. 
45 QUARTERS, supra note 16, at 65. 
46 Id. 
47 Id.   13 
Dosier seems legitimately surprised that he cannot, after many occasions, convince a 
Vietnamese laundry girl to sleep with him for a hefty sum of money.
48   
  Furthermore, aside from obtaining drugs from Vietnamese civilians, servicemen 
in these works often resort to numerous, less conventional sources as well.  Troops in the 
field could develop talents as “scroungers,” soldiers who would be able to hustle supply 
personnel for more desirable rations such as “eggs and bacon and No. 10 cans of fruit, 
and real ground coffee.”
49  Not surprisingly, then, resourceful servicemen in these works 
seem able to scrounge government-issued drugs, such as the barbiturate Darvon, from the 
platoon medics.  Medics themselves might themselves be addicted,
50 or they could 
benefit from their access by making “deals” with soldiers.  In Close Quarters, for 
instance, Dosier makes “a deal” with his troop medic, Stepik, for Darvons, which he 
proceeds to abuse liberally on a daily basis.
51  Furthermore, the commonplace process of 
looting fallen enemy corpses – whose belongings would transfer “by rights” to the 
serviceman who killed him – could yield desirable items such as greasy pouches of 
marijuana,
52 though the quality of these drugs might be wanting.  As Dosier describes the 
enemy dope, it was “some real garbage”
53 compared to his usual fare of “Cambodie [sic] 
dope.”
54  All in all, should drugs be desired by troops, they could easily be obtained, 
whether by purchase, agreement, or even looting within the helter-skelter commercialized 
culture of Vietnam.   
 
                                                 
48 QUARTERS, supra note 16, at 272. 
49 Id. at 240. 
50 THINGS, supra note 9, at 91. 
51 QUARTERS, supra note 16, at 254. 
52 QUARTERS, supra note 16, at 76. 
53 Id. at 254. 
54 Id. at 66.   14 
II. Appeal of Drug Use to Military Personnel in Vietnam 
A. Historical Background 
Vietnam not only offered a widespread availability of drugs, but also presented an 
environment with multiple risk factors which made drug abuse appealing to many 
servicemen.  Perhaps the most “obvious” risk factor was that the war “removed young 
men,” the demographic most amenable to drug experimentation, “from the restraints of 
home and put them together in a predominantly male society.”
55  In this environment, 
with “peers to encourage and support such use,” drug abuse could become a “shared 
social activity” which was not considered deviant, but rather, the norm.
56  Furthermore, 
drug use among soldiers prior to their arrival in Vietnam was certainly not unheard of, 
especially given that “less privileged” young men were more likely to be drafted than 
those better educated.  Military studies demonstrated that earlier drug use or delinquency 
prior to service were “strong predictors” of drug use in Vietnam.
57   
However, given that these characteristics of youth aggregation and prior 
delinquency were presumably present in all modern American wars to at least some 
extent, it is imperative to consider factors particular to Vietnam which might account for 
its disproportionate rates of drug abuse. In his seminal work, Vietnam: A History, Pulitzer 
Prize winning journalist Stanley Karnow noted that  
Vietnam was unique among American wars in at least two respects: under 
a rotation schedule, draftees were committed for only a year – which 
meant, for many that survival became their main occupation; but in a war 
without front lines, few could feel safe anywhere.
58 
 
                                                 
55 EDWARDS, supra note 6, at 128. 
56 Id. at 127. 
57 Id. at 126. 
58 KARNOW, supra note 33, at 479.   15 
This characterization helps to highlight why American troops in Vietnam may have faced 
consistent psychological trauma more severe than anything encountered by servicemen in 
previous wars.  As a result, drug usage in Vietnam would have proved particularly 
appealing as a means of “psychological solace” from the stress of a guerilla war, during a 
soldier’s year-long countdown until the end of his tour.
59  
Indeed, true “battle lines” could not be delineated in Vietnam, and as such, “safety 
[was] never guaranteed.”
60  Despite the ostensible justification that the American 
intervention in Vietnam (and, a decade earlier, in Korea) was intended to “save” the 
South Vietnamese people from communist aggression, neither South nor North Vietnam 
even existed as separate state entities until the beginning of the Cold War.  As such, the 
Vietnam War was of course a civil war, and, accordingly, enemy troops could easily 
blend in with South Vietnamese civilians (many of whom were sympathetic to their 
cause) or into Vietnam’s dense tropical environment.  Indeed, North Vietnamese or 
National Liberation Front (NLF, known colloquially as Vietcong or VC) forces 
traditionally avoided large-scale combat operations, and instead preferred small-scale, 
hit-and-run attacks which provided them with an element of surprise and control of the 
terrain.
61  In this environment, “Vietnam confused and confounded innocent young 
Americans…they were also chronically apprehensive and rightly suspected that any 
Vietnamese might be hostile.”
62   
The American response to these tactics included the “daily ordeal” of exhausting, 
small-scale, “search-and-destroy” patrols against hidden enemy units, which meant 
                                                 
59 EDWARDS, supra note 6, at 127. 
60 Id. 
61 KARNOW, supra note 33, at 475. 
62 Id. at 481.   16 
slogging through thick jungles and rice paddies.
63  During these operations, American 
troops might be killed in any number of ways by the “unseen enemy” – whether by mines, 
booby traps, or mortars.
64  Or, perhaps, servicemen might go on “cordon-and-search” 
missions, which involved surrounding villages, searching for hidden guerillas, and 
destroying homes or rice caches which might prove useful to the enemy.  Ironically, such 
tactics assured that if these villagers “weren’t pro-Vietcong before [Americans] got there, 
they sure as hell were by the time [they] left.”
65  Also, as Karnow explains, it was the 
“enemy’s ability to return to villages that had supposedly been cleaned out” which 
proved particularly frustrating, as American troops “could never ‘liberate’ territory but 
found themselves going back again and again to fight the same battles in the same areas 
with the same unsatisfactory results.”
66   
Finally, no matter the efficacy of their military tactics, at the end of the day, 
servicemen still found themselves amidst circumstances where drugs might prove quite 
appealing.  For one thing, there was of course the “heat and rain and insects,” which 
“were almost worse than the enemy.”
67  Meanwhile, for soldiers who were lucky enough 
to serve outside forward areas and within the comparative luxury of the “wire” of rear 
echelon bases, they still had to cope with the “everyday boredom of rear echelon duty.”
68  
Toward the later years of the war, with Richard Nixon’s avowed policy of 
“Vietnamization” (the gradual withdrawal of American forces, enabled by the build-up of 
South Vietnamese military capabilities) in full effect, more and more Americans were 
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removed from combat operations.   This development helped contribute to the “feeling of 
lost purpose” and “malaise that rapidly spread through U.S. Forces.”
69  Within this reality, 
the mind-numbing effects of widely available illicit drugs could provide a GI a much-
needed escape, and it is perhaps in illuminating the very desperation of this need where 
the narrative weight of novels at hand can prove the most effective. 
II. Literary Analysis 
The aforementioned themes of youth, fear, and disillusion set amidst the confines 
of a uniquely horrible and frustrating war prove nearly universal throughout these novels.  
For example, in Going After Cacciato, Private Paul Berlin of the Americal Division, 
operating in I Corps, undergoes an unusual orientation session during his second day at 
Chu Lai Command Center: 
In the morning the fifty new men were marched to a wooden set of 
bleachers facing the sea.  A small, sad-faced corporal in a black cadre 
helmet waited until they settled down, looking at the recruits as if 
searching for a lost friend in a crowd.  Then the corporal sat down in the 
sand.  He turned and gazed out to sea.  He did not speak.  Time passed 
slowly, ten minutes, twenty, but still the sad-faced corporal did not turn or 
nod or speak.  He simply gazed out at the blue sea.  Everything was clean.  
The sea was clean, and the sand and the wind.   
 
They sat in the bleachers for a full hour.  
 
Then at last the corporal sighed and stood up.  He checked his wristwatch.  
Again he searched the rows of new faces.   
 
“All right,” he said softly.  “That completes your first lecture on how to 
survive this shit.  I hope you paid attention.”
70 
 
This wistful sequence in Going After Cacciato hints at the madness to come for many of 
these youthful servicemen – and perhaps, at the coping mechanisms, such as drug abuse, 
which these soldiers would soon develop in response.  Berlin, like many of his peers, is 
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young and naïve, having arrived straight out of high school; he “was lost” and “had never 
heard of I Corps, or the Americal, or Chu Lai.”
71  Yet within weeks, Berlin finds himself 
armed in the field, ordered to kill an elusive enemy who for whatever reason is trying to 
kill him.  Similarly, in The Short-Timers, Joker describes his best friend Cowboy (an 
accomplished Marine and squad leader), as someone who “does not look like a killer, but 
like a reporter for a high school newspaper, which he was, less than a year ago.”
72  The 
absurdity of what these youths, straight out of high school, are expected to do day-in, and 
day-out, is well captured in a disturbing scene from The Things They Carried, where the 
sociopath Azar blows up a squad mate’s adopted puppy on a whim.  When the squad 
reacts in horror, Azar indignantly replies, “‘[w]hat’s everybody so upset about…I mean, 
Christ, I’m just a boy.’”
73  In another instance in that novel, one of Azar’s comrades 
likens Vietnam to the “Garden of Evil,”
74 and explains, “[o]ver here, man, every sin’s 
real fresh and original.”
75  Indeed, this theme regarding the corruption of innocence, 
perhaps first introduced in Genesis, permeates many of these works.   
Compounding this feeling of youthful naiveté is the sense of uncertainty among 
many of these servicemen – who are mostly draftees – as to why they are in Vietnam in 
the first place.  Some of the soldiers view the American presence in Vietnam as simply 
the whim of high-ranking officers ignorant of the day-to-day muck of combat, or of far-
off civilian strategists in Washington.  For example, Joker, the sardonic narrator of The 
Short-Timers, has a confrontation with a ludicrous colonel who berates him for wearing a 
peace symbol pin.  The colonel lets known his doubts regarding Joker’s patriotism, and 
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wants to know whether Joker treasonously believes “that the United States should allow 
the Vietnamese to invade Viet Nam just because they live here?”
76  The irony implicit in 
the colonel’s absurd question highlights the lack of a sense of unified purpose among 
many of these soldiers.  As one of Joker’s companions rationalizes his indifference to the 
Marines’ mission: 
No Victor Charlie [i.e. Vietcong] ever raped my sister.  Ho Chi Minh 
never bombed Pearl Harbor.  We’re prisoners here.  We’re prisoners of the 
war.  They’ve taken away our freedom and they’ve given it to the gooks, 
but the gooks don’t want it.  They’d rather be alive than free.
77 
 
Thrust into this uncertain milieu, the young grunts come to conclude that only one thing 
is truly important: survival.  In The Things They Carried, O’Brien narrates a conversation 
he has with his young daughter many years after the war: 
“This whole war,” she said, ‘why was everybody so mad at everybody 
else?” 
 
I shook my head.  “They weren’t mad, exactly.  Some people wanted one 
thing, other people wanted another thing.” 
 
“What did you want?” 
 
“Nothing,” I said. “To stay alive.”
78 
 
 
However, even this stripped down goal of mere survival becomes seemingly futile 
in the horrific settings of these works, where guerilla tactics and the dense Vietnamese 
environment provide the constant possibility of death and a sheer inability to feel safe.  
Sniper
79 or mortar
80 fire might come at any time of the night, for instance, and trip-
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mines
81 or remote-detonated mines
82 could be blown on any trail.  Even live grenades, the 
soldiers are told, can be surreptitiously inserted into a soldier’s pockets by Vietnamese 
civilians.  In The Short-Timers, the distaste which the men have for this type of warfare is 
well pronounced.  For instance, Donlon, the platoon radioman, expresses his fondness for 
the urban warfare he encounters in the Hue:  “I hope we stay here.  This street fighting is 
decent duty.  We can see them here.”
83  Even in the rear areas, moreover, the troops do 
not find themselves necessarily able to relax.  In Paco’s Story, the narrator recounts how 
the Vietnamese who worked as clerks or barbers “during the day” at Phuc Luc base camp, 
were “zips [i.e. guerrillas] at night” – and how “one zip [they] body-counted one time 
couldn’t booby-trap a shithouse any better than he could cut hair.”
84  This everyday 
potential for betrayal leads to much frustration among the troops.  As Lieutenant Corson 
of Going After Cacciato recalls better days at war in Korea, he notes: “[I]t was a decent 
war.  Regular battle lines, no backstabbing crap.  You won some, you lost some, but what 
the heck, it was a war.”
85 
Thus, the soldiers endure constant psychological strain because of this 
unconventional nature of the war in Vietnam.  In Going After Cacciato, for instance, the 
squad becomes more and more tense as they wait for the inevitable, conventional surprise 
attack, which, for some reason, never comes.  For two months the enemy lays in wait, 
and seems to be playing a perverse joke on the squad.   Berlin is the first to experience a 
sense of uneasiness: “He couldn’t quite place it.  A milky film clouding the hot days.  
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Lapping motions at night.  Artificiality, a sense of imposed peace.”
86  Soon, the rest of 
the squad beings to feel it as well – the squad goes on a rampage, destroying tunnels, 
hooches, wells, fences, paddies, while killing water buffalo and chickens – “[b]ut they 
could not drive the enemy into showing himself, and the silence was exhausting.”
87  They 
are “sluggish and edgy,” and various soldiers break out with “psychosomatic” problems – 
such as boils, ulcers, back pain, numbness.
88  To the chagrin of his flustered squad mates, 
the erudite medic, Doc Peret, continually and smugly rationalizes what is going on 
around them: “It’s basic psychology – silence.  Gets you feeling edgy, and then 
bang…That’s what it is, the gook version of Psy-Ops [psychological operations].”
 89  
Furthermore, on top of this constant psychological strain inflicted by the enemy 
guerrillas, the authors describe the constant myriad of nuisances the troops are subject to 
in the jungle, where the oppressive heat and crabs, fungus, mosquitoes, and leeches seem 
to take over.  As noted above, the radioman in The Short-Timers, Donlon, preferred the 
urban warfare in the Hue to that in the jungle.  The Hue, by comparison, offers “cover, 
resupply, even some areas where you can cut a few Z’s without digging a hole.”  
Furthermore, unlike in the jungle, there were no “rice paddies full of slope shit to swim 
in...immersion foot….jungle rot…[nor] leeches falling from trees.”
90  Similarly, on his 
final night in-country, Dosier in Close Quarters reflects on how he has changed from 
being in the field for an entire year: “I am filthy all the time.  I feel that grit, that crawl of 
the skin, something itching all the time, and greasy….The taste in my mouth has gone 
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fallow….Everything tastes like chalk on my tongue….I have lost the simple rhythm of 
breathing.  It must be due to the humidity.”
91   
Accordingly, the authors of these novels seem to stress how the use of drugs 
provides an easy way for these young soldiers to detach themselves from this horrible 
reality.  Drugs such as marijuana and Darvon, it seems, are viewed as the wonder drugs 
for all sorts of ailments.  They are used to “mellow down” after patrols or marches.
92  
They are used for celebrations, such as to celebrate Christmas.
93  And they are used to 
simply be able to sleep at night.
94  Most poignantly, moreover, they are used to cope with 
the death of a comrade,
95 or even to come to terms with the killing of an enemy.  In 
Paco’s Story, for instance, after a gruesomely intimate knifing of an enemy soldier, Paco 
returns to his bunker, “his concentration deep…his whole body skittish – Paco always 
able to recall the tears in the guy’s eyes while he whispered clearly and plainly.  ‘Vinh 
biet.  Vinh biet.  Vinh Biet.’ (‘I will never see forever.’).”  That night, Paco “drank every 
canteen in sight and smoked dope until he was high out of his mind.”
96  Similarly, in 
Close Quarters, after killing his first enemy – by strangulation – the new arrival Dosier is 
dispensed a liberal “handful” of Darvons and smokes marijuana – which his lieutenant 
pointedly ignores, perhaps out of empathy.
97  Mercifully soon after, “the Darvons finally 
come and [Dosier’s] breathing eases.”
98   Indeed, with so many reasons or excuses for 
these troops to turn to drug abuse, the authors describe some soldiers who seem willing to 
permanently detach themselves from reality.  In The Things They Carried, for instance, 
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the neurotic “Ted Lavender, who was scared, carried tranquilizers…[and] 6 or 7 ounces 
of premium dope, which for him was a necessity.”
99   On some occasions, when Lavender 
“went too heavy” on his drugs, he would “give a soft, spacey smile and say…‘We got 
ourselves a nice mellow war today.’”
100  Similarly, Dosier eventually makes a deal with 
the platoon medic for Darvon, after which he would on a daily basis “pop a couple 
Darvons with [his] morning coffee, do a smoke, then…mount up,” patrolling hostile 
territory as “happy-go-lucky Deadeye (‘a dozen smiles to the mile’).”
101  Indeed, in the 
unique environment of Vietnam, an artificial feeling of “happy-go-lucky” might prove 
preferable to the alternative of facing a terrible reality. 
 
III. Enforcement of Military Prohibitions on Illicit Drug Use 
A. Historical Background 
The general official response of the military toward drug use among troops, at 
least early in the war, was court-martial and discharge – often dishonorably
102 and 
perhaps with a hard labor sentence added on.
103  However, prosecuting troops for such 
offenses could prove quite difficult and conviction would certainly not be a forgone 
conclusion.  For instance, in the circumstance where an incident involved Vietnamese 
civilians, as was common, judge advocates might find the Vietnamese police to be 
unreliable or have trouble bringing Vietnamese civilians into court.
104  And rarely would 
a soldier ever find himself facing charges in a Vietnamese court.
105  In the case United 
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States v. Beeker,
106 the Court of Military Appeals broadly held that “both wrongful use 
and wrongful possession of marijuana or narcotics on or off base, has a singular military 
significance.”  As such, any drug-related cases, if they were brought at all, would be 
handled strictly in military courts,
107 where rigid search-and-seizure procedures and strict 
rules of evidence led to complications unless a suspect were caught (unlikely) in the 
actual act of abusing, buying, or dealing drugs.  These procedural and evidentiary 
problems “perhaps challenged military lawyers most in their struggle against drugs.”
108   
Furthermore, the military judicial system was severely taxed by the sheer number 
of drug cases which arose in Vietnam.  As Henry Aronson, a civil rights lawyer and a 
member of the Lawyers Defense Committee (which provided free civilian counsel for 
troops in Vietnam)
109 noted, “‘drug cases have become to the judicial system here [in 
Vietnam] what automobile accidents have become to the civil courts at home.’”
110  In this 
context, “there barely seemed to be enough judge advocates to handle massive 
caseloads.”
111  As a result, officers in Vietnam generally might opt for lesser (but more 
easily obtained) punishments than outright discharge, such as Article 15 non-judicial 
punishments, which could be handed down speedily and with less paperwork.
112  
Summary court-martials (with less procedural protections for the accused and involving 
only one officer as the convening authority) were similarly expedited, but the authority 
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could not impose severe punishments such as dishonorable or bad conduct discharges, 
longer confinements, or hard labor sentences.
113   
Beyond these logistical, procedural, or evidentiary problems which hindered the 
by-the-book prosecution of drug offenses among troops in Vietnam was the 
understandable unwillingness of officers to discharge otherwise capable soldiers during 
time of war for drug-related crimes.  Furthermore, officers would not want to “bring 
attention to any blight infesting their command.”
114  Vietnam was also notorious for its 
high incidence of murders of unpopular officers or NCOs by “fragging.”  Soldiers might 
frag superiors who were “incompetent or too ‘gung ho’ or as a way to evade combat 
patrol duty or to get rid of an officer…who was getting too close to a black-market 
operation or an illicit drug ring.”
115  Understandably, then, young officers could prove 
unwilling to strictly enforce laws regarding drug use, thus “diluting the deterrent effect on 
potential drug users.”
116   Finally, of course, it seems true that in all wars, practical 
exigencies will inevitably lead to the failure to observe all strict formalities, unimportant 
as they might seem in the wider context of constant battles for life among death. 
B. Literary Analysis 
A powerful theme which emerges in these works is the development of 
“informal” standards in the field, where strict formalities can lose their allure and 
significance amid the day-to-day struggle for survival.  Indeed, these informal standards 
may end up taking precedence over military regulations.  By stressing the contempt 
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which most enlisted men had for the latter formalities, moreover, the authors make quite 
real the threat of dissent or even murder which could emerge if officers did not ease up 
on these soldiers amid the day-to-day horror and grit of Vietnam.  As such, one can 
understand how illicit drugs might come to be abused with impunity. 
With survival at the forefront of the minds of the men, the green soldiers in these 
works quickly adapt to the new codes of conduct which dominate in the field.  For 
instance, when Dosier first reports for duty in Close Quarters, his particularly obnoxious 
sergeant gives him a customary “Teamwork, fight like hell, and sleep on your own time” 
speech, while demanding that Dosier unfailingly address him as “Platoon Sergeant 
Surtees.”
117  Dosier nods and complies, and notes: “I didn’t know any different.  I was 
still garrison.  I had just come from Fort Knox…where I called everybody sir or 
sergeant.”
118  However, these “garrison” formalities quickly come to a dramatic end for 
Dosier.  During one of his first ambushes, Dosier’s platoon captures a wounded enemy 
soldier, who proceeds to wail in pain – potentially surrendering their location to 
surrounding communist forces.  Consequently, Dosier’s experienced comrade, Cross, 
tells the medic to inject the prisoner with a deadly dose of morphine.  As Dosier protests, 
Cross offers him powerful advice: “You give gooks a break like that and you ain’t gonna 
last…the only thing more fucked up than being here, is getting killed here.”
119     
  In this context, a distinction arises between what O’Brien terms “formal” and 
“informal” Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), and these latter SOPs “were more 
important than the Code of Conduct.”
120  O’Brien notes that the soldiers’ informal 
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“routinization of the war…helped make it tolerable,” and extended to the most trivial 
facets of life in the field – such as what one could talk about and when or when to rest or 
march or keep guard.  Tellingly, O’Brien notes, these informal SOPs covered even “when 
to send out ambushes and when to fake them [i.e. to higher military authorities].”
121     In 
a similar spirit of self-preservation, the soldiers in these novels follow another informal 
SOP by making liberal use of mechanical ambushes, or “booby traps” – the use of which 
qualifies as a war crime under the Geneva Convention.   As the narrator in Paco’s Story 
explains, “the zips used booby traps…and since what is sauce for the goose is sauce for 
the gander, everyone used them.”
122   Other apparent informal SOPs include the “right” to 
“souvenir”
123 (i.e. take) any items found on one’s victim, such as cash, AK-47s (a 
Russian-made assault rifle superior to the standard issue M-16), or, as mentioned above, 
drugs.
124  And the common allowance for the use of such illegal drugs is, of course, the 
informal SOP which is at the heart of this paper. 
  Indeed, in all of these novels, drug use seems to be done quite casually, without 
much fear of discipline.  The soldiers, for instance, smoke marijuana anytime and 
anywhere, the motto being, “smoke ‘em if you got ‘em.”
125  Servicemen might “party” in 
the rear, where “[i]t was one of the rituals” and “you did it on principle.”
126  Or, soldiers 
might even use drugs in the most extreme battle situations, such as during helicopter rides 
on the way to being dropped off in “hot” landing zones.
127  The only exception to this 
general rule seems to be when the soldiers find themselves confronted by comfortably 
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rear-echelon career officers or NCOs – derisively referred to as “lifers,” “housecats,” or 
“poges.”  For instance, when Dosier and his friend, Quinn, need to desperately get away 
from their normal surroundings in order to clear their minds after learning of the deaths 
of some close comrades, they walk far through the camp into a makeshift bar situated 
among the more permanent “housecat hooches”
128  Here, as they proceed to smoke as 
usual, the bartender pleads with them, noting that “there’s officers around here that don’t 
dig it.”
129  From the perspective of the “grunts,” these “housecat” officers not only play 
war games – from afar – with the lives of their soldiers for the sake of mere medals,
130 
but also demonstrate ignorance of the grunt’s daily plight by dogmatically insisting on 
adherence to military procedure.  Encounters with these officers prove enervating and 
hate-inspiring.  After committing his first kill, for instance, a “dirty, unshaven, and dead 
tired” Joker is met on the road by a jeep-driving colonel.
131   The colonel – whose “jungle 
utilities are razor-creased,” berates Joker for his failure to salute him, and immediately, 
Joker wishes he “was back in the shit,” for at least “[i]n battle there are no police, only 
people who want to shoot you.”  In battle, he note wryly, “there are no poges….[who] try 
to kill you on the inside.”
132   
  The more respected officers in the field, however, look past strict military 
procedure out of empathy for their troops.  The most telling contrast between a respected 
officer and a hated officer arises in Going After Cacciato.  The platoon’s first commander, 
Lieutenant Martin, continually insists that his men follow formal SOPs and search enemy 
tunnels, rather than merely destroying them without risking his soldiers’ lives.  As such, 
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“Martin, who had trained at the Point [i.e. West Point], violated the informal SOPs, and 
the men hated him.”
133  In contrast, Martin’s beloved replacement, Lieutenant Corson, 
“simply ordered the tunnels blown, or blew them himself, and he saw no incompatibility 
between this and his mission as a soldier.”
134  Similarly, while he “had been trained to 
treat [his men]…as interchangeable units of command,”
135  the well-respected Lieutenant 
Cross in The Things They Carried instead “preferred to view his men not as units but as 
human beings.”
136  This attitude is exemplified when Rat Kiley, the platoon’s dependable 
and brave medic, eventually has a nervous breakdown and shoots himself in the foot in 
order to be sent home.  Pointedly, Cross “went over and said he’d vouch for him that it 
was an accident.”
137  Such empathy or tolerance extends, of course, to drug use as well.  
When Lieutenant Brian joins Dosier’s platoon in Close Quarters, “one of the first things 
he did” was to promote this heavy drug user to Specialist Fourth Class, and soon enough, 
to Sergeant.
138  Perhaps unsurprisingly, Brian is also a drug user,
139 as is Corson in Going 
After Cacciato,
140 and the dependable Lieutenant Shortround in The Short-Timers.
141  
Furthermore, in these novels, even when officers are not actual participants in forbidden 
activities such as drug use, they might walk away – as Lieutenant Brian does while an 
enraged Quinn mutilates a fallen enemy soldier in Close Quarters – “so he could say, in 
truth, that he had seen nothing, in case he was ever asked.”
142 
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A darker motivation (aside from genuine empathy) which also may motivate these 
well-liked officers, of course, is the threat of “fragging.”  Indeed, Going After Cacciato’s 
Martin, who continually insists that his men search tunnels – even after two are killed 
below ground – eventually meets his end in this manner, after the members of his squad 
express their unanimous assent to his murder by symbolically “touching” the grenade 
which is to be used.
143  Similarly, in The Short-Timers, Shortround is killed after he 
threatens to discipline a soldier who attempts to rape a Vietnamese civilian.
144  The 
vulnerability of these officers is starkly expressed in Close Quarters, when the hated 
Sergeant Surtees – alone – comes across Dosier and Quinn smoking marijuana in the base 
camp chapel.  After Surtees (an African American) threatens to have them put in prison, 
Quinn threateningly asks Surtees what he “sees” around him.  Before he can answer, 
Quinn says, “I see Deadeye fucken Dosier and my humble self and a coal-black n*gger, 
and a clear field of fire for a hundred meters around.”
145  Soon after receiving this threat 
from two of the platoon’s most respected killers, Surtees disappears.
146  Furthermore, the 
awareness of such danger certainly seems to be on the minds of the officers, such as that 
of Lieutenant Cross.  Particularly guilt-ridden after the death of one of his men by sniper 
fire – which he blames on his own inattentiveness – Cross becomes determined to 
“impose strict field discipline,” which includes confiscating marijuana.
147  He knows, 
however, that “[a]mong the men there would be grumbling, of course, and maybe 
worse…”
148 
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These threats seem particularly real in the Vietnam environment; where brutal 
one-on-one killing becomes part of the daily routine, rank and strict military rules can 
simply “cut no shit.”
149   The soldiers’ easy willingness to kill is cogently demonstrated, 
for instance, in one scene in The Short-Timers.  When an MP sergeant “lifer” confronts 
Joker, a corporal, and orders him onto a working party to fill sandbags, an argument 
arises, and Joker feels “[a]n explosion building up inside.”
150  Immediately, Joker 
chambers a round into his rifle, jams the barrel into the MP’s stomach, and watches him 
back slowly away, whereupon Joker’s astonished “new guy” companion, Rafter Man, 
notes: “You weren’t bluffing.  You would have killed that guy.  For nothing.”
151  
Succinctly, Joker explains: 
 It's not the kind of thing you can talk about.  There's no way to explain 
stuff like that.  After you've been in the shit, after you've got your first 
confirmed kill, you'll understand…Don't kid yourself, Rafter Man, this is a 
slaughter.  In this world of shit you won't have time to understand.  What 
you do, you become.
152   
 
Sardonically, Joker surmises that this uncontrollable murderous instinct may have been 
the intent of his Marine training as a means of creating more effective, uncontrollable 
killers.  As Joker narrates of his boot-camp experience, “The drill instructors are proud to 
see that we are growing beyond their control.  The Marine Corps does not want robots.  
The Marine Corps wants killers.
153   Surrounded by these uncontrollable killers, the more 
pragmatic of the officers in these works seem disinclined to impose strict military 
discipline to the point of prohibiting drug use among their troops. 
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Conclusion 
As seen through the eyes of the “grunts” in these works, the widespread usage of 
illicit drugs by American military personnel in Vietnam can be understood in view of the 
widespread availability of the drugs, the allure of them as coping mechanisms to deal 
with a uniquely terrible war, and the inability or unwillingness of authorities to strictly 
enforce prohibitions against them.   
However, despite the widespread use of drugs described in the historical and 
literary accounts discussed above, it is clear that no drug epidemic or resulting crime 
wave broke out once these soldiers returned home, a fearsome scenario which indeed was 
one of the government’s greatest concerns with regard to drug abuse in Vietnam.
154  
Starting in late 1969, the armed services started a “rehabilitation” program which would 
allow drug abusers to clean themselves up and return to service as newly useful 
soldiers.
155  Through this program, a soldier desiring rehabilitation could voluntarily 
come forward to an authority figure, without fear of discipline under a promise of 
“amnesty,” and be placed in a recovery program.  Soldiers who cheated while on the 
program could be discharged unfavorably – as any drug abuser without amnesty would – 
but soldiers who completed the program successfully might be returned to duty or given 
an administrative discharge, which would allow the soldier to obtain future treatment in 
Veterans Administration facilities as a civilian.
156  In addition, starting in June 1971, after 
the advent of the “heroin epidemic,” a mass urine-testing program was implemented in 
order to screen all enlisted men prior to discharge into the U.S.  In the event of a positive 
test, servicemen would be required to detoxify for two weeks before being allowed 
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home.
157  The idea behind this program, propagated by Dr. Jerome Jaffe, was to get 
servicemen “off opiates before they embarked for home, [so that] home would be a place 
which for most of them had no association with drugs, and an environment which would 
therefore not trigger a craving for drugs.”
158  Under this behavioral paradigm, then, the 
military authorities sought to keep the U.S. free of the abuse-inducing environmental cues 
which had presumably riddled the Vietnam milieu.
159   
Unsurprisingly, then, servicemen often cleared themselves, on their own initiative, 
of opiates, desperate as they were to get home as quickly as possible.  Indeed, only about 
11 percent of these subjects tested positive (in comparison to a 45 percent estimate for 
usage).
160  Moreover, studies attained by repeated interviews of servicemen for up to 
three years after discharge indicated only a 6 percent relapse rate among those addicted to 
heroin while serving in Vietnam.
161  This relatively low rate may be attributed, at least in 
part, to environmental differences between the U.S. and Vietnam, such as the low quality 
and high price of heroin in the U.S. (as opposed to its cheap and widespread availability 
in Vietnam); the need to restart personal lives and careers (as opposed to doing anything 
to “survive” a short-term stint in a psychologically taxing war); and the legal deviance 
and social stigma attached to drug abuse (as opposed to tacit if not outright acceptance of 
it by certain military authorities).
162 
Yet while these optimistic statistical figures demonstrate that returning 
servicemen from Vietnam did not constitute the flood of “drug-hungry and gun-happy 
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addicts” of Congress’s nightmares, they do not necessarily imply that these men returned 
to the U.S. completely whole.  Indeed, a common theme running through the novels 
studied in this paper is that while these soldiers may return home alive, and perhaps even 
healthy, they come nevertheless missing an irreplaceable part of their youth and humanity.  
Even those who “survive to be short-timers,” Joker notes, will make it home to America, 
but “home won’t be there anymore and [they] won’t be there either,” as “the war has 
lodged itself” on their brains as “a black crab feeding.”
163  In Close Quarters, Dosier 
echoes a similar, perhaps more wistful sentiment as he reminisces about the past year 
during his last night in Vietnam: 
The war has swallowed me, it has clamped off all the veins, and I’m high 
on dope and Darvon and mo-gas and sick and tired of the fucking footrace, 
so I jump down in front of the track, with the bowie knife between my 
teeth, and snarl….I can never go home.  I just want to see it.  I won’t say a 
thing, cross my heart.  I just want to see it one more time.  I want to smell 
it, touch it ever so lightly, put my ear to it and hear it….so now, only the 
ritual remains.  I have not been getting closer, only farther away.
164 
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Appendix 
 
 
Table 1: “Cases Investigated”
165 
 
Calendar Year  World-Wide  Continental U.S.  Vietnam 
Hard Narcotics 
1966  521  275  39 
1967  573  274  89 
1968  940  608  132 
1969  1,871  1,479  243 
1970  3,401  2,368  716 
1971 (Q1)  1,909  807  822 
Marijuana 
1966  3,096  1,892  503 
1967  5,536  3,493  1,267 
1968  11,507  6,335  3,225 
1969  19,139  8,809  6,490 
1970  26,902  13,999  6,955 
1971 (Q1)  10,261  4,888  2,071 
Dangerous Drugs 
1966  917  648  20 
1967  1,532  1,144  34 
1968  1,594  1,078  103 
1969  3,357  1,849  833 
1970  7,541  2,695  1,374 
1971 (Q1)  2,861  1,782  436 
 
 
Note: “Hard Narcotics” refers to heroin while “Dangerous Drugs” refers to 
amphetamines and barbiturates.
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Table 2: “Rates Per 1,000 of Military Individuals Investigated”
167 
 
Calendar Year  World-Wide  Continental U.S.  Vietnam 
Hard Narcotics 
1966  .16  .13  .14 
1967  .17  .13  .19 
1968  .32  .41  .32 
1969  .67  .89  .59 
1970  1.29  1.57  2.06 
Marijuana 
1966  .98  .89  1.80 
1967  1.63  1.62  2.69 
1968  4.84  4.65  7.99 
1969  7.60  6.21  14.77 
1970  10.56  9.20  20.27 
Dangerous Drugs  
1966  .29  .31  .07 
1967  .45  .54  .07 
1968  .50  .69  .20 
1969  1.21  1.21  .78 
1970  2.55  2.62  3.73 
 
 
Note: “Hard Narcotics” refers to heroin while “Dangerous Drugs” refers to 
amphetamines and barbiturates.
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